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# THE NEW MIGRATION WAVE FROM UKRAINE TO EU COUNTRIES: SCALE, FACTORS, CONSEQUENCES

## ABSTRACT

The full-scale war ignited by the Russian Federation caused a huge wave of migrants from Ukraine to EU countries. It drastically changed the situation in political and socio-economic areas in Ukraine and the host countries. The current situation with migration is unpredictable and it is reaching a catastrophic scale. It makes a threat to the national security of Ukraine. Preventing the collapse of the country's economy is impossible without a balanced government policy in this area. The purpose of this paper is to study the new wave of migration from Ukraine to European countries after the beginning of the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022, update data on the scale of forced migration of Ukrainians to European countries, analyze the influence of factors affecting the size of migration flows of forced migrants from Ukraine to European countries, and the consequences inflicted by this wave.

In our research we systematized data on the number of Ukrainian forced migrants in various European countries, analyzed statistical data on the amounts of financial support received by Ukrainian forced migrants in various European countries and examined data on the number of job vacancies in European countries. Based on these data, we ran a correlation analysis of the relationship between the number of Ukrainian forced migrants and the amount of monthly financial support, and the number of job vacancies. The factors influencing the allocation of Ukrainian forced migrants among European countries were identified and systematized. We demonstrated the importance of considering these factors for solving the problem of the return of Ukrainian forced migrants to Ukraine.

We conclude that the amount of financial support is not closely related to the number of Ukrainian migrants in a certain country. More significant is the influence of the factor of the opportunity to get a job and adapt to living conditions in new countries. This indicates the intentions of Ukrainian forced migrants to stay in these countries for a long time, and possibly stay in these countries in the future. To facilitate the return of forced migrants to Ukraine and reduce migration losses in the country, it is proposed to develop a government program for the return of Ukrainian forced migrants, which would cover institutional, organizational and economic dimensions, and would apply the practice of European countries.

**Keywords:** forced migration, migration wave, external migration, international migrants, labor migration, UN statistics, migration from Ukraine

**JEL Classification:** F22

## INTRODUCTION

The number of Ukrainian migrants abroad began to grow steeply after the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022. In terms of the number of displaced persons abroad, this migration wave is already the largest in Europe and the world since the Second World War. It is also one of the largest in terms of the share of the total population of Ukraine that went abroad. The main factor behind this wave of migration is the desire of migrants to reach a safe place of residence for themselves and their children.

Considering the scale of this wave of migration from Ukraine, we can expect serious economic consequences for Ukraine in the future due to a lack of labor resources, a decrease in aggregate demand, a drop in GDP, a drop in investment opportunities, etc. To predict future events and design plans for migrants' return it is necessary to analyze the intentions of Ukrainian forced migrants regarding their future life, the factors that influence these intentions, and monitor the dynamics of these processes.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

The works of many Ukrainian scientists, in particular the works of E. Libanova, S. Pirozhkov, O. Malinovska, O. Pozniak, I. Prybytkova and others, are devoted to the study of issues of external migration of Ukrainians. The results of research by these and other authors were collected in the National Report of 2018 [1]. In this collective work, the causes of migration, the influence of various factors on migration processes, and assessments of the volume of external migration of Ukrainians were analyzed in detail. After the start of the COVID pandemic in 2019, national scientists studied the impact of the corona crisis on the transformation of migration processes from Ukraine [2, 3]. To combat the COVID-19 pandemic, EU countries have introduced many quarantine restrictions on international travel, both outbound and inbound. This complicated the processes of labor migration, changed the direction and characteristics of migration flows, but did not change their strength [3].

After the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and the wave of Ukrainian forced migrants triggered by it, there emerged an issue of assessing the migration losses of the population of Ukraine and the economic consequences of the migration wave. The results of the first published study of this issue are presented in the work of E. Libanova et al. [4]. In the part devoted to external migration, the authors analyze data from available sources of statistical information on the number of Ukrainian forced migrants: the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine. According to the authors [4], the possible level of migration losses of the population of Ukraine will amount to at least 600-700 thousand people. This number may increase depending on various factors: the duration of hostilities, the living conditions of forced migrants from Ukraine in other countries, and the conditions for their safe return to Ukraine, etc. However, given the aggravation of the migration crisis under the current circumstances, this problem requires additional analysis.

## AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The aim of this paper is to study the new wave of migration from Ukraine to European countries after the beginning of the full-scale aggression of the Russian Federation on February 24, 2022. The objectives are to perform a quantitative analysis of the scale of forced migration of Ukrainians to EU countries, to update data on the number of Ukrainian forced migrants, to determine the factors influencing the size of migration flows of Ukrainian forced migrants to different EU countries, and to analyze the influence of these factors and consequences caused by the new wave of migration.

## METHODS

In our analysis, we used the method of observation for the dynamics of the process of forced external migration of Ukrainians, the method of analysis and synthesis for the systematization of available statistical data, the statistical method for determining the influence of factors on migration flows, and the method of generalization when formulating conclusions. Standard tools of MS Excel and the MS Excel Data Analysis package were used for calculations and the construction of diagrams.

## RESULTS

The scale of external migration of Ukrainians after February 24, 2022, is the largest in recent decades. The data on the number of Ukrainian forced external migrants as of November 15, 2022, in comparison to other major migration crises after 1960 are shown in Table 1. The number of forced Ukrainian migrants has reached almost 19% of the population of Ukraine and already exceeds the number of migrants in other crises.

**Table 1. The number of forced migrants and percentage from the total country population.** (Sources: [5], [6], [7])

Country	Crisis Event	Migrants	% of population
Ukraine	Russian invasion 2022	7,841,359	18.9%
Syria	Civil war 2011-2022	6,878,950	35.1%
Afghanistan	Civil war 1989-1996	6,339,095	51.8%
Afghanistan	USSR invasion 1979-1989	5,643,989	47.9%
Venezuela	Crisis 2014-2022	5,083,357	15.1%
Afghanistan	Taliban regime 1996-2001	3,840,545	18.3%
Afghanistan	Taliban insurgency 2002-2021	3,091,800	10.7%
Ethiopia	Derg regime 1974-1991	2,567,998	7.3%
South Sudan	Civil war 2013-2020	2,446,340	19.5%
Iraq	Insurgency and US occupation 2003-2012	2,336,914	8.2%

Thanks to the implementation by the EU and other countries of simplified border-crossing requirements for Ukrainians fleeing the war, there appeared opportunities for free travel abroad for citizens of Ukraine (except for men aged 18-60, who are prohibited to leave the country during martial law). At the same time, after arriving to countries and receiving the status of temporary protection Ukrainian migrants automatically receive full rights for work and social assistance, access to healthcare and education systems, as well as assistance for finding and paying for housing. It essentially implies that they get the same opportunities as migrants who received the status of permanent residence in these countries. As a side effect, this situation opened opportunities for many Ukrainian migrants who had been in European countries before February 24, 2022, to legalize there with new status.

Due to the unpredictability of the course of the war in Ukraine and its duration, at this stage it is difficult to make predictions about the time when Ukrainian forced migrants will begin to return home a masse, and how many of them will return. But there is no doubt that the longer the war lasts, the stronger the ties of Ukrainian migrants with the countries of their stay will become. This will happen thanks to their integration into the social institutions of these countries, establishing new personal contacts, learning the language, and getting an education in the host countries. All of these will ultimately make it easier for them to find a job, and open new opportunities for them to arrange permanent residence in these countries. Moreover, it can be expected that after lifting the ban on foreign travels of men aged 18 to 60, some men will leave Ukraine to reunite with their families abroad and to start a new life.

After the beginning of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, and the subsequent wave of Ukrainian migrants, the issue of migration from Ukraine has been in the center of attention of many international and governmental organizations and research institutions. Organizations created under the auspices of the United Nations to solve the problems of refugees and migrants, in particular the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have become the most aware of the situation. UNCHR systematically collects and disseminates statistical information on Ukrainian refugees, commissions and publishes sociological surveys among refugees, and encourages research on this topic. Thanks to the involved resources and operational information, UNCHR has become the main source of systematized information on this issue.

UNHCR regularly receives data from participating countries on the number of refugees and forced migrants registered in these countries. These data as of November 15, 2022, are collected in Table 2. According to UNHCR, the number of registered forced migrants from Ukraine in European countries reached 7,841,359 as of November 15, 2022 [5]. The total number of forced migrants includes 2,852,395 migrants registered in the Russian Federation and 15,624 migrants registered in Belarus [5]. Thus, according to UN data, as of November 15, 2022, there are 4,973,340 forced migrants from Ukraine in other European countries, while 4,725,612 of them are registered under various temporary protection programs implemented by the EU countries [5].

From the data presented in Table 2, it can be concluded that 2/3 of Ukrainian forced migrants (66.4%) reside in five countries of continental Europe: Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Spain. There is a noticeable big difference between the number of Ukrainians in Poland and Germany compared to their numbers in other countries. In general, half of all Ukrainian forced migrants (50.6%) are now in Poland and Germany, and 30% of all Ukrainian forced migrants in European countries are registered in Poland.

**Table 2. The number of Ukrainian forced migrants in European countries as of November 15, 2022. (Source: [5])**

Country	Registered		Number of border crossings			Left for other countries	
	Persons	%	from Ukraine	to Ukraine	difference	Persons	%
Poland	1,497,849	30.12%	7,583,850	5,528,491	2,055,359	557,510	27.12%
Germany	1,019,789	20.51%	-	-	-	-	-
Czech Republic	460,415	9.26%	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	173,231	3.48%	-	-	-	-	-
Spain	153,054	3.08%	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	145,000	2.92%	-	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	143,100	2.88%	-	-	-	-	-
France	118,994	2.39%	-	-	-	-	-
Slovakia	100,783	2.03%	936,086	672,570	263,516	162,733	61.75%
Moldova	95,963	1.93%	693,013	337,343	355,670	259,707	73.02%
Romania	90,106	1.81%	1,525,677	1,209,046	316,631	226,525	71.54%
Austria	86,439	1.74%	-	-	-	-	-
Holland	79,250	1.59%	-	-	-	-	-
Lithuania	69,751	1.40%	-	-	-	-	-
Switzerland	69,162	1.39%	-	-	-	-	-
Estonia	62,239	1.25%	-	-	-	-	-
Belgium	59,818	1.20%	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	57,557	1.16%	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	53,095	1.07%	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal	52,970	1.07%	-	-	-	-	-
Sweden	48,360	0.97%	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	38,588	0.78%	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	36,983	0.74%	-	-	-	-	-
Latvia	35,283	0.71%	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	32,102	0.65%	-	-	-	-	-
Hungary	31,989	0.64%	1,746,421	-	-	-	-
Montenegro	28,639	0.58%	-	-	-	-	-
Georgia	25,204	0.51%	-	-	-	-	-
Serbia and Kosovo	22,019	0.44%	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	19,997	0.40%	-	-	-	-	-
Croatia	19,050	0.38%	-	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	14,336	0.29%	-	-	-	-	-
Slovenia	8,439	0.17%	-	-	-	-	-
Luxembourg	6,756	0.14%	-	-	-	-	-
North Macedonia	6,356	0.13%	-	-	-	-	-
Azerbaijan	3,944	0.08%	-	-	-	-	-
Albania	2,505	0.05%	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	1,766	0.04%	-	-	-	-	-
Malta	1,603	0.03%	-	-	-	-	-
Liechtenstein	364	0.01%	-	-	-	-	-
Armenia	360	0.01%	-	-	-	-	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	132	0.003%	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,973,340</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>12,485,047</b>	<b>7,747,450</b>	<b>4,737,597</b>	-	-

The data on the number of border crossings can also be used for preliminary estimation of the number of Ukrainian forced migrants. Starting from 24.02.2022, travelers can cross the Ukrainian border only through checkpoints for land transport, as civil air traffic between Ukraine and other countries has been suspended. According to the UNHCR data [5], from February 24 to November 15, 2022, in total 15,354,147 border crossings in the direction from Ukraine were recorded. This figure includes 2,869,100 border crossings in the direction of the Russian Federation and Belarus, according to data given by these countries to the UN. There is no data on the number of border crossings from these countries in the direction of Ukraine. The number of border crossings in the direction from Ukraine to other neighboring countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Moldova) during the same period is 12,485,047, and the number of crossings in the reverse direction is 7,747,450 (see Table 2). The last figure does not include the number of border crossings from Hungary to Ukraine, as this country does not provide such data. The difference between the number of border crossings to/from Ukraine is 4,737,597 crossings, which is quite close to the number of Ukrainian forced migrants in European countries (not including the Russian Federation and Belarus). According to the UNHCR data, as of November 15, 2022, there were 4,973,340 forced migrants from Ukraine in European countries (see Table 2). The difference between the two figures is 235,743 people. If we add to the number of return crossings an unknown number of such crossings from Hungary, then this difference will become even bigger.

The discrepancy between the number of registered Ukrainian forced migrants and the difference between the number of border crossings with and into Ukraine can be explained by several reasons: legalization in European countries of Ukrainians who had been there before February 24, 2022, departure of Ukrainian migrants from the territory of the Russian Federation to European countries, and the arrival of Ukrainian citizens to European countries from other countries of the world due to the impossibility or their unwillingness to return to Ukraine now. Since there is no data on the above instances, the direct use of border crossings numbers gives incomplete results and does not account for all possible options.


However, based on the number of border crossings for individual countries, it is possible to draw conclusions about the number of Ukrainian forced migrants who entered a certain country and then moved to other countries. For that, the difference between the number of entries/exits to/from the country and the number of migrants currently registered in a given country was calculated. These calculations are shown in Table 2. According to these calculations, the number of Ukrainian forced migrants who moved from Poland to other countries is 557,510 people. That is, about 27% of forced migrants who entered Poland from Ukraine later moved to other countries. Table 2 shows that the percentage of Ukrainian forced migrants who later left other countries bordering Ukraine is significantly higher (61-73%). It is impossible to make such calculations for Hungary due to the lack of data on the number of border crossings from this country in the direction of Ukraine. But it can be assumed that this percentage is higher than in other countries since Hungary has the lowest number of Ukrainian forced migrants among all the countries bordering Ukraine.

The relocation of Ukrainian forced migrants among European countries continues, as does the arrival of new migrants, but the situation with their distribution by country is stabilizing. Double registration of Ukrainian migrants in different countries is possible if migrants register in a certain country, and then go to another country and register there, without deregistering in the first one. As the total number of migrant movements between countries decreases, such cases will have less impact on the overall statistics. According to the results of a sociological study conducted by UNHCR among Ukrainian forced migrants in European countries in September 2022 [8], 13% of them planned to return to Ukraine within the next three months, and the other 87% either do not intend to return or have not yet decided. Among them, 79% plan to stay in their current country of residence, 17% have not yet decided whether they will move somewhere, and 4% plan to move to another country [8].

There are certain factors that affect the distribution of Ukrainian forced migrants among different countries. Among these factors are geographical proximity to Ukraine, cultural proximity and language, the presence of relatives or acquaintances in the host country, the number of vacancies and the possibility of employment, the average salary, organizational and material assistance received by temporarily protected persons in the host country, and other factors.


An important factor is an ability to get at least the minimum necessities of life in a certain country. Host countries meet housing needs in a variety of ways: living in refugee centers, living in private homes with government subsidies to host families, financial assistance for rental housing, and more. Needs for food and daily expenses are provided by providing meals in certain places, the distribution of food items and clothes, the payment of financial support, and other measures. According to the results of a sociological study by UNHCR [8], social assistance received by temporarily protected persons from host states is the most significant source of their income. Figure 1 shows the sources of income of Ukrainian forced migrants with a differentiation between countries that directly border Ukraine and those that do not. Several answer options were possible in the survey, so the sum of the columns exceeds 100%. Two other important sources of income are the wages received by migrant workers and their own savings. At the same time, the role of wages is significantly

higher in the countries bordering Ukraine, which indicates a likely larger number of employed Ukrainian forced migrants in the countries bordering Ukraine, and the relatively greater importance of wages as a source of income since the amounts of social benefits in these countries are smaller.



**Figure 1. Sources of income of Ukrainian forced migrants in European countries.** (Source: [8])


According to the information from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) [9], European countries set different amounts of social benefit payments to Ukrainian forced migrants registered under the temporary protection scheme (Figure 2). The chart shows payments per adult per month, in a case of payments for a family of a few people, the monthly amounts for the 2nd and subsequent family members are reduced. In addition to that, in many countries, there are also subsidies for rented accommodation. These payments were not included in the amount of financial support received by an average adult having the status of temporary protection.



**Figure 2. Amount of financial support to Ukrainian forced migrants in European countries (euro/month per person).** (Source: [9])

It can be assumed that since social benefits are the most important source of income for Ukrainian forced migrants, the number of forced migrants in a certain country is related to the amount of social financial support. That is, a larger amount of support will attract more migrants to this country. We performed a statistical analysis to test the strength of the relationship between the amount of financial support received by temporarily protected persons from Ukraine and their number in this country. Figure 3 shows a scatter plot comparing monthly payments per person (horizontal axis) and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants (vertical axis, logarithmic scale with a base of 10) in a certain country. Three European countries stand out: Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, where the sums of payments are not the largest, but the number of Ukrainian forced migrants significantly exceeds their number in other countries. From this diagram, it can be concluded that for the entire group of European countries presented, there is no strong relationship between the number


of refugees and the amount of financial support, and therefore this factor is not of primary importance, at least for the entire set of European countries.



**Figure 3. The relationship between the amount of monthly payment per person and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants in European countries.** (Sources: [5], [9])


To estimate the strength of the relationship between the number of Ukrainian forced migrants and the amount of financial support we calculated the correlation coefficient. For the entire set of countries presented in Fig. 3 (set 1), it is equal to 0.154. This value of the correlation coefficient indicates a weak connection between the amount of financial support and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants. The correlation coefficient was also calculated for a reduced set of countries (set 2). To eliminate the influence of the cultural proximity factor, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic were excluded from the total population in set 2. These countries (except the Czech Republic) also border Ukraine. The correlation coefficient for set 2 is equal to 0.526, which is significantly higher than that for set 1. It indicates the medium strength of the relationship between the amount of financial support and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants for the countries in set 2. In order to reduce the influence of the factor of geographical proximity the correlation coefficient was calculated for set 3 - the countries of set 2, with the exception of the countries bordering Ukraine: Romania and Hungary. The correlation coefficient for set 3 is equal to 0.551 and is slightly higher than the correlation coefficient for set 2. It indicates the medium strength of the relationship between the amount of financial support and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants for the countries in set 3. Based on the values of correlation coefficients for sets 1-3 we conclude, that for countries more distant from Ukraine (in the cultural and geographical sense), the factor of the size of monthly payments is more important than in Poland, Slovakia, or Czech Republic, but even there the strength of the relationship is medium.

The second most important source of income for Ukrainian forced migrants is their salaries. At the same time, a chance of finding a job is a more important factor than a salary amount, because the majority of Ukrainian migrants do not speak the languages of countries where they live temporarily, and therefore they can mainly apply for low-paid jobs that are associated with manual labor. The salary level for such jobs is usually close to the minimum in a country. We chose the number of unfilled vacancies in European countries as per Eurostat [10] and the Office of National Statistics of the UK (ONS) [11] data as a proxy for the factor that represents a chance to find a job. The vacancy rate in each country is highly correlated with this country's population size and indicates the unmet demand for labor that is currently present in that country. The data on the number of vacancies in EU countries and the UK as of the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2022 is shown in Figure 4. There is no information from several countries, in particular France, Italy, Denmark and Estonia, where such statistics are not made public.



**Figure 4. The number of vacancies in European countries as of 2Q 2022.** (Sources: [10], [11])

To determine the strength of the relationship between the number of vacancies in a certain country and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants in that country we performed a statistical analysis. Figure 5 shows a scatter plot comparing the number of vacancies (horizontal axis, logarithmic scale with base 10) and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants (vertical axis, logarithmic scale with base 10) in European countries. The diagram reveals that there is a relationship between the number of vacancies and the number of forced migrants. Only Poland noticeably falls out of the overall picture due to a significant excess of the number of migrants over the number of available vacancies. This situation significantly reduces the opportunities for Ukrainian refugees to find employment in Poland. This allows us to draw a preliminary conclusion that there is a significant number of Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland who do not intend to work there and stay there for a long time. Therefore, it is likely that this country is a temporary home to many Ukrainian forced migrants who plan to return to Ukraine soon. They remain in Poland due to geographical proximity and the most developed land transport connection with Ukraine.



**Figure 5. The relationship between the number of vacancies and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants in European countries.** (Sources: [5], [10], [11])

To estimate the strength of the relationship between the number of Ukrainian forced migrants and the number of vacancies we calculated the correlation coefficient. For the entire population (28 countries) presented in Fig. 5 (set 1), it is equal to 0.468. This value of the correlation coefficient indicates a medium strength of the relationship between the number of vacancies and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants. The correlation coefficient was also calculated for the reduced population of countries (set 2). To reduce the influence of the cultural proximity factor, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic were excluded from set 1. The correlation coefficient for set 2 is equal to 0.862, which is significantly higher than that for set 1. It suggests a strong relationship between the number of vacancies and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants for the countries in set 2. To reduce the influence of the factor of geographical proximity, we calculated the correlation coefficient for the countries in set 2 excluding countries that border Ukraine: Romania and Hungary, 23 countries in total (set 3). The correlation coefficient for set 3 is equal to 0.864, which almost coincides with the correlation coefficient for set 2 and suggests a strong relationship between the number of vacancies and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants for the countries in set 3.

## DISCUSSION

Comparing the diagram of the relationship between the number of vacancies in a certain country and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants with the diagram of the relationship between the amount of social benefits and the number of Ukrainian forced migrants, and the values of the correlation coefficients, it can be concluded that the number of vacancies (and therefore the number population and the state of the economy of a certain country) has a greater influence on the number of Ukrainian forced migrants than the amount of social benefits. Among all European countries, Poland and Germany stand out in terms of the number of forced migrants. A large number of Ukrainian forced migrants in Poland is mainly explained by the geographical and cultural proximity of Poland to Ukraine and the convenience of transport connections. A large number of Ukrainian forced migrants in Germany is primarily explained by the prospects of employment in this country, as well as the high level of financial support. Other three countries also stand out: the Czech Republic, Spain and Slovakia. For the Czech Republic and Spain, this can be explained by the large number of migrants from Ukraine who had been living in these countries before February 24, 2022. The Czech Republic and Spain are among the five EU countries (Italy, Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, and Spain) with the largest number of Ukrainian migrants before 2022 [12]. A large number of settled Ukrainian migrants in a country facilitates the arrival, search for housing, job search and social adaptation of newly arrived migrants from Ukraine. The possibility of accelerated adaptation to new living conditions is a strong argument when migrants make decisions about where to go. A large number of Ukrainian forced migrants in Slovakia can be explained by the same factors as in Poland: geographical and cultural proximity to Ukraine.

Important issues that need to be addressed soon are the return of Ukrainian migrants, and their adaptation to life in the new realities in Ukraine. According to the results of the UNHCR sociological research [8], the main reason for not returning to Ukraine, which is indicated by 86% of Ukrainian forced migrants, is the danger of staying in Ukraine because of the war there. After the war ends, the severity of the problem of safety in Ukraine will decrease. But still, there are other important considerations that worry Ukrainian forced migrants: unemployment (indicated by 32% of Ukrainian migrants), lack of housing (13%), lack of basic amenities for life (12%) and lack or low quality of education for their children (10%). If we translate these percentages into absolute numbers, we can see that these problems concern hundreds of thousands and millions of Ukrainian forced migrants. The problem of housing is especially acute. 16% of respondents reported that their homes in Ukraine were destroyed completely or partially, and another 12% did not know the condition of their homes [8]. In absolute figures, it means the lack of housing for millions of people in Ukraine, and such a problem is not an easy one to resolve. To address this and other mentioned problems, it is necessary to design a program at the government level for the return of Ukrainian forced migrants using the current experience of European countries which are currently hosting Ukrainian forced migrants. After all, after returning to Ukraine, a significant part of Ukrainian forced migrants will face the same problems that they face upon their arrival to European countries: lack of housing, no sources of income, and no access to healthcare and education for children. If not properly addressed and resolved, these problems will diminish the appeal of migrants to return to Ukraine and will lead to greater migration losses of the Ukrainian population.

## CONCLUSIONS

An analysis of the factors that affect the intentions of Ukrainian forced migrants to stay in a certain country and their intentions regarding further actions has been carried out. It has been shown that the amount of financial social support is not closely correlated with the number of Ukrainian migrants in a certain country. More significant is the influence of the factor of a chance to find a job and adapt to living conditions in a new country. It indicates the intentions of Ukrainian

forced migrants to stay in host countries for a long time, and possibly settle in these countries in the future. This statement is of greater importance for countries that do not border Ukraine, and which are not culturally close (for example, Germany). It can also be assumed, that most Ukrainian forced migrants who are planning to return to Ukraine either in the near future or more distant future are living in countries that border Ukraine (Poland and Slovakia). Social benefits in these countries are low, and employment opportunities for forced migrants from Ukraine are limited by the number of available vacancies. So, after the situation with security in Ukraine improves, and the war ends, the largest number of Ukrainian forced migrants will be returning from these countries. It is possible to conclude more definitely about this after further sociological research in these countries. The timing of the return of Ukrainian forced migrants will depend on the course of hostilities and the end of the war. The longer the war lasts, the stronger will be the ties of Ukrainians with their host countries, and it can be predicted that fewer of them will return to Ukraine in the future.

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## **НОВА МІГРАЦІЙНА ХВИЛЯ З УКРАЇНИ ДО КРАЇН ЄС: МАСШТАБ, ЧИННИКИ, НАСЛІДКИ**

Повномасштабна війна, розпочата Російською Федерацією, викликала величезну хвилю мігрантів з України до країн ЄС. Це суттєво змінило ситуацію і в політичній, і в соціально-економічній сфері України та приймаючих країн. На сьогодні ситуація з міграцією є непередбачуваною й наближається до катастрофічної та без перебільшення несе в собі загрозу національній безпеці України. Недопущення обвалу економічного потенціалу країни неможливе без зваженої державної політики в цьому напрямі. Метою статті є дослідження нової міграційної хвилі з України до європейських країн після початку повномасштабної агресії Російської Федерації 24.02.2022 року, актуалізація даних щодо масштабів вимушеної міграції українців до європейських країн, аналіз чинників, що впливають на розмір міграційних потоків вимушених мігрантів з України до європейських країн, та наслідків, що спричинені цією хвилею.

У результаті проведених досліджень були систематизовані дані щодо кількості українських вимушених мігрантів у різних європейських країнах. Проаналізовано статистичні дані щодо розмірів фінансової допомоги, яку отримують українські вимушені мігранти в різних європейських країнах, та дані щодо наявності вакансій у європейських країнах. На підставі цих даних був проведений кореляційний аналіз взаємозв'язку між кількістю українських вимушених мігрантів та сумою щомісячної фінансової допомоги й кількістю вакансій. Виявлено та систематизовано чинники, які впливають на розподіл українських вимушених мігрантів між європейськими країнами, показано важливість розгляду цих чинників для вирішення проблеми повернення українських вимушених мігрантів до України.

Зроблені висновки, що розмір соціальної допомоги не має тісного зв'язку з кількістю українських мігрантів у певній країні. Суттєвішим є вплив фактору можливості працевлаштуватися та адаптуватися до умов життя в нових країнах. Це свідчить про наміри українських вимушених мігрантів перебувати в цих країнах протягом тривалого часу, а можливо, і залишитися в цих країнах у майбутньому. Для повернення більшої кількості вимушених мігрантів та зменшення міграційних утрат населення України запропоновано розробити на державному рівні програму повернення українських вимушених мігрантів, яка охоплює інституційний та організаційно-економічний вектори, використовуючи досвід європейських країн.

**Ключові слова:** вимушена міграція, міграційна хвиля, зовнішня міграція, міжнародні мігранти, трудова міграція, статистика ООН, міграція з України

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