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EXTERNAL MIGRATION IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

ABSTRACT

The beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war caused a powerful wave of migration of Ukrainians to Western Europe. The protracted nature of the war and the opportunity to socialize in the EU countries made some Ukrainian refugees not want to return to Ukraine, which creates a shortage of labour, on which the government has high hopes for post-war economic recovery. The purpose of the work is to study the structure, dynamics and causes of forced external migration from Ukraine in 2022 and subsequent re-emigration, outline effective measures for the return of forced migrants. For an empirical study of the dynamics and structure of migration processes for the period under study, UNHCR data were processed. The systematic analysis made it possible to substantiate the theoretical and methodological foundations and regularities of the formation of a re-emigration policy in Ukraine, and the method of expert evaluations - to assess the impact of external migrations caused by military actions in Ukraine on socio-economic development. Analysis of the reasons for migration and re-emigration of Ukrainians in 2022 allows us to assert that the reasons for re-emigration are much more important. This gives reason to claim that the majority of Ukrainian migrants will return to Ukraine after the end of the war if the government implements state programs to provide housing for re-emigrants who lost their homes due to the war, preferential conditions for renting premises, construction of multifunctional settlements with appropriate environmental conditions on the sites of monofunctional settlements, state financial support and creation of new jobs. At the same time, the authors predict uneven settlement of Ukraine, where the western and central regions of the country will be more populated. The biggest challenge for the government will be the return of highly qualified Ukrainians with a high level of adaptation to another culture, who know foreign languages and IT technologies, and whose services EU countries are extremely interested in. For this category of migrants, additional simplified business opening procedures and a broad information campaign are needed, which will build confidence in a successful business in Ukraine.

Keywords: war, economic, development, migration, employment

JEL Classification: H 56, O15, R 23

INTRODUCTION

Armed conflicts and wars of the past have determined that the scale of external labour migration in the context of hostilities depends on the nature of the confrontation (on a religious, worldview, or existential basis), the use of certain types of weapons (total war, the use of weapons of mass destruction, terror against the civilian population, point impressions), of citizens' evaluations of the prospects for the end of the war depending on the perceptions of the government's ability to organize an effective counterattack against the aggressor and faith in the capabilities of its armed forces. The warring parties also used the organization of large migration flows to significantly complicate the supply of the means necessary for waging war on the front line.

Citizens' decision to leave Ukraine or return from abroad to their place of permanent residence or another Ukrainian settlement was influenced by the perception of the power of the Russian army, which by 2022 was positioned as the second army in the world and by massive Russian missile attacks on Ukrainian cities. The destruction of objects that did not belong to the military infrastructure and shelling of the civilian

population of Ukraine from the very first days of the war was used by the Russian Federation to create a panic mood and to cause powerful migration waves. The main motive was not only to harm the organization of the resistance but also to undermine the faith of Ukrainians in the possibility of defending one's own country.

The way how Russia conducts hostilities and its determination of the strategic objectives of the war has formed a consensus in Ukrainian society regarding the definition of the nature of the war with the Russian Federation. People define it as an existential conflict with the need to confront the aggressor to preserve and strengthen Ukrainian statehood. Awareness of this significantly impacted the scale and direction of migration flows. For example, at the end of February 2022, the desire of millions of citizens to leave the territory of Ukraine was observed. Nevertheless, over time, the scale of migration began to decrease. Moreover, an increase in the number of those who decided to return to their native country, even in war conditions, was already observed. The resilience of Ukrainian citizens in resisting Russian aggression turned out to be much greater than many Ukrainian, and foreign analysts had previously predicted. The awareness of the conflict with the Russian Federation as an existential confrontation had the most significant impact on decisions regarding emigration. This decision was also influenced by the position of several European countries, which not only provided shelter to Ukrainian migrants but also assessed the benefits of involving Ukrainian citizens in economic activities in their interests. These factors created the prerequisites for including several European countries in the race for Ukrainian workers in the labour market. On top of that, the attractiveness of the employment conditions of Ukrainians abroad was a significant factor in the decision to refuse to return home.

On the other hand, the adoption of such a decision was significantly influenced by the conditions of socialization in the recipient countries for Ukrainian migrants. The specifics of the development of the European labour market and economic conditions largely determined the position of individual EU countries regarding the use of the potential of Ukrainian migrants. At the same time, the growing need for qualified specialists also determined the position of the Ukrainian government regarding granting permits for specific categories of the population to leave Ukraine.

This research aims to determine the nature and scope of forced external migration from Ukraine and subsequent re-emigration, as well as possible measures to return forced migrants to their homeland.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The study of migration processes in Ukraine under the conditions of the Russian-Ukrainian war can be conditionally divided into several groups. One of them is the scientific research of sociologists who, based on the analysis of relevant survey data, tried to determine the mood of migrants, their intentions to return to Ukraine, and possible government actions to ensure successful re-emigration. Leading sociologists attempted to predict the scale of external migration based mainly on the possible terms of the hostilities end. Director of the Institute of Demography and Social Research, named after M. V. Ptukhy, NAS of Ukraine, E. Libanova, in her speeches, repeatedly claimed the possible loss of about 5 million able-bodied population after the end of the war because family reunification can take place, not in Ukraine, but outside its borders (Removska O., Melnychyna Yu., 2022; Libanova E., 2022). At the same time, analysts who analysed the results of sociological surveys drew attention to the gradual growth of the so-called "sense of home" among migrants, which pushed them to return to Ukraine even in war conditions (National Academy of Science, 2022; Gradus Research Company, 2022; Rating sociological group, 2022; Gradus Research Company, 2022).

At the same time, the researchers noted the difficulty of calculating the number of Ukrainian migrants on the territory of the EU. Such problems were connected with the fact that some Ukrainian citizens, forced to leave their native homes during the war, did not seek to register for temporary protection. Holders of biometric passports could freely stay in the territory of the European Union for up to 90 days without mandatory registration. And those who retained the ability to work remotely and/or had enough savings to cover their own needs for a few months may not see registration as an urgent need (Filipchuk L. et others, 2022).

The second group of studies consists of the scientific works of economists, who paid more attention to the definition of potential threats that could be caused by large-scale foreign migration in war conditions. Bioanalyzing the peculiarities of Ukrainian migration to Poland from the point of view of the scale and dynamics of population migration at the national and sub-national levels, O. Levytska drew attention to the threat of external labour migration for Ukraine (Levytska O. 2022). According to A. Hayudskyi, the return of Ukrainians will depend primarily on measures implemented by the state. He emphasized that the authorities should offer financial and regulatory tools to cities and united territorial communities to ensure re-emigration. He supported his opinion that local authorities know the needs of citizens better and can more successfully implement the necessary measures than the central leadership (Kapustynska K., 2022). Sandvik K., Garnier

A. drew attention to the movement of migrants who at one time emigrated to Ukraine to escape persecution by the Taliban (Sandvik K., Garnier A., 2022).

Thus, noting the threats to national security in connection with the mass departure of citizens abroad, scientists assess the prospects for the return of migrants somewhat differently. Most researchers note that the threat of a prolonged war can stimulate refugees to seek socialization in EU countries. Other scientists believe that balanced measures initiated by the power structures of Ukraine can become a powerful incentive to ensure re-emigration.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

This research aims to determine the nature and scope of forced external migration from Ukraine and subsequent re-emigration, as well as possible measures to return forced migrants to their homeland.

METHODS

The complexity and contradictions of migration processes in the conditions of the russian-Ukrainian war determined the specifics of using scientific approaches and research methods. In the process of the conducted research, a set of methods was used, namely: economic and mathematical methods - when identifying the trends of migration processes in the conditions of the russian-Ukrainian war, factors of transformation of its structure; graphic-analytical method - when visualizing the studied socio-economic phenomena in the field of external migrations of the population caused by the armed aggression of the russian federation; methods of statistical analysis - when determining the impact on the transformation of socio-economic relations of the dynamics and intensity of external labor migration of the population of Ukraine; to study the nature and extent of external migration at the beginning of the full-scale invasion and in subsequent periods; system analysis - when substantiating the theoretical and methodological foundations and regularities of the formation of re-emigration policy in Ukraine; the method of expert assessments - when assessing the impact of external migrations caused by military actions in Ukraine on socio-economic development; structural and functional analysis - when establishing relationships between the tools of state institutions and programs of local authorities for the purpose of adaptation and consolidation of re-emigrants in Ukraine.

RESULTS

Scales and Nature of external migration

On February 24, 2022, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees F. Grandy emphasized that after the invasion of the russian federation into Ukraine, "the humanitarian consequences for the civilian population will be devastating" (UNHCR, 2022). His judgment was likely based on the russian army's estimation of being the world's second strongest. However, this belief turned out to be fake. The russian military could not overcome the resistance of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the meanwhile. However, in the first days after russia announced a "special military operation" directed against Ukraine, russian troops advanced relatively quickly in the southern direction, capturing Kherson and approaching Kharkiv and Sumy. The approach of the aggressor's troops to Kyiv and individual cases of actions of russian saboteurs on the territory of the Ukrainian capital was perceived as particularly painful. Such actions caused a sharp increase in the number of refugees, some of whom moved to the western state border to leave the territory of Ukraine (Walsh P., Sumption M., 2022).

The motivation for external migration was mainly the desire to wait out the hot phase of the war in a safe place. The departure was carried out mainly by families using vehicles. The consequence of these actions was congestion of routes in western Ukrainian and many central regions. However, the departure of the vast majority of men abroad was prohibited a few hours after the start of hostilities. This prohibition significantly impacted families making decisions about external migration because solely women with children and elderly people were allowed to leave for neighbouring countries. Hoping the war would not last long, they expected to use their funds or receive refugee status. And the most significant number of citizens left Ukraine during the first weeks of the war, as evidenced by the data on the number of Ukrainian citizens who went abroad from February 24 to March 24, 2022 (Figure 1).

Please note that during the first month after the start of the so-called "special military operation", there were three "surges" of external migration: in the first three or four days, after two weeks and after three weeks. It is possible to identify a particular connection between "surges" of external migration and the adaptive capabilities of a person to react to a change in the situation.




Figure 1. The number of people leaving Ukraine (24 February - 24 March 2022). (Source: based on (UNCHR, 2022))

The first surge was most likely caused by panic, the second and third by large-scale destruction of Ukrainian cities, which resulted in refugees losing their homes. As of March 3, 2022, alone, a week after the Russian invasion, more than 1 million refugees (2.3% of Ukraine's population) were forcibly relocated to neighbouring European countries, including Poland, as well as Hungary, Moldova, and Slovakia (Martín I., 2022).

The decision to leave Ukraine was mostly made when citizens had little time to leave the areas where active hostilities were taking place. Citizens often could only take what they could transport by motor vehicle or as hand luggage on trains. Most often, this made it difficult to settle in a new place based on one's capabilities. Therefore, most migrants hoped for help from the receiving countries. And such help was an essential factor in the decision to leave. However, as a rule, the receiving countries determined the terms when Ukrainians had to find a new job and the conditions for the provision of assistance, which included, among other things, the monitoring of the refugees' expenses. And if, during the first one or two months of staying abroad, the requirement for employment seemed optional since there was a calculation for a short-term armed confrontation on the territory of Ukraine, then the further implementation of such a requirement created some significant problems. Such problems were mainly due to the language barrier and offers of less prestigious work than the one that migrants performed in Ukraine. In addition, employers' offers were often limited to blue-collar labour, which was problematic for many Ukrainian women who left with children (European Commission, 2022).

The conditions of stay and employment abroad, as well as the growing belief in the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to repulse the enemy's offensive, gradually reduced the flow of refugees. This trend reversed over time - to the return home of many who went abroad hoping to wait out the active phase of the war. About 80% of forced migrants already in April 2020 wanted to return to Ukraine (Interfax-Ukraine, 2022).

A comparative analysis of the number of external migrants and those who returned allows us to assess the scale of outward migration and threats to the state's national security associated with losing a part of qualified workers.

As of mid-March 2022, about 6% of citizens left Ukraine (Gradus Research Company, 2022). As of March 22, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 3,626,546 citizens left Ukraine (Filipchuk L. et al., 2022). However, some scientists claimed that during the first two months after the Russian invasion, about 5 million forcibly displaced people left Ukraine (Walsh P., Sumption M., 2022). Almost 5.5 million refugees have already left Ukraine (UNHCR, 2022). Compared to 2021, the population decreased by 11%.

Another source of information on the number of external migrants will be data from border guards. However, such data remain insufficiently accurate to estimate the number of refugees. Because quantitative indicators tend to be overestimated, this trend can be explained by the fact that refugees crossed the borders of several countries on their way, which was recorded by the relevant authorities. In several cases, the movement of refugees from one country to another was motivated by the overloading of the infrastructure of the cities where they tried to stay. The situation was particularly critical in some cities in Poland, as such cities were not designed to provide high-quality service to a rapidly growing number of people (Rosenzweig-Ziff D., 2022). The warm and responsive reception of Ukrainian citizens, providing them with opportunities for a comfortable stay in their new places of residence, and the payment of monetary aid significantly eased the fate of the refugees. However, Ukrainian citizens still felt the lack of housing and the consequences of overloading the city's household infrastructure. Figures 2 and 3 show the scale of border crossing by refugees from Ukraine.




Figure 2. Border crossings from Ukraine to countries neighbouring (on 26.02.2023). Note: * - the figure for individual refugees recorded in the country is an estimate as potential further movements or returns cannot be factored in for the time being. (Source: based on (UNCHR, 2023))

However, the data on arrivals to the Russian Federation and Belarus may include persons who were forcibly deported to these countries. The quantitative indicators of migrants to Romania are given, including those who first crossed the border of Moldova. In total, cross-border movements accounted for more than 7.3 million cases of crossing state borders (UNHCR, 2023).




Figure 3. Individual refugees from Ukraine recorded across countries EU (at 26.02.2023). Note: * - the figure for individual refugees recorded in the country is an estimate as potential further movements or returns cannot be factored in for the time being. (Source: based on (UNCHR, 2023))

The Russian authorities offered Ukrainian citizens to move to Sakhalin. In addition, in some cases, they were prohibited from leaving their places in the Russian Federation where they were taken for two years with mandatory employment. Such actions of modern Russia differed little from Stalin's deportations, which led to significant changes in the settlement structure of Ukraine.

Some European Union states have shown interest in the socialization of Ukrainian migrants. The reason for this involvement was a reduction in the population of these countries due to a decrease in the birth rate. Therefore, they tried to solve this problem at the expense of external migrants (Mulska O. et others, 2021).

To understand the nature of external migration and the reasons for re-emigration, it is worth comparing the composition of migrants before 2022 and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In 2015, about 80% of Ukrainian labour migrants planned to stay in Poland for almost a year, and in 2020, 52% of them were already scheduled to work there for more than three years. At the same time, in 2020, almost a third of Ukrainians had plans for assimilation in Poland: obtaining a permanent residence permit, obtaining citizenship, moving a family, purchasing real estate or starting their own business (Economic Truth, 2020). At the same time, according to a survey by the Research & Branding Group, 1.3 million citizens planned to leave Ukraine in search of work in 2020, and the total potential of Ukrainian migration was about 5 million people (Kirichenko E., 2020). However, we are talking about working-age persons who had the ability and opportunity to work abroad. During the first period of working outside of Ukraine, they mostly did not particularly worry about the comfort of living conditions. They were attracted by the opportunity to earn more money than in Ukraine. And in the vast majority of cases, it was determined by the possibility of not paying taxes in the recipient countries of Ukrainian foreign labour migrants.

In 2022, the situation changed significantly. A significant part of the migrants received the status of refugees and therefore secured themselves control by the relevant authorities regarding the number of expenses. In addition, if by 2022, a significant part of Ukrainian workers in the EU countries did not pay taxes to the budgets of the respective states, then persons who received refugee status and were forced to take up official employment were obliged to pay taxes. Therefore, for those who could get an official job, the amount of "net" earnings decreased due to the payment of taxes. Awareness of these significantly influenced ideas about the specifics and conditions of life and employment in EU countries.

After the start of the so-called "special military operation", most Ukrainian migrants were women and children, with slightly fewer elderly people leaving. Children and the elderly, as a rule, could not count on employment and, on the contrary, needed additional funds for maintenance. And quite often, such funds came from relatives in Ukraine.

E. Libanova claimed that the vast majority of migrants are people with higher education, and according to various data, their share among those who left was 60-70% (Ukrinform, 2022). One can agree with the researcher's statement that at first, most migrants wanted to return to Ukraine as soon as possible. However, the view that the availability of higher education significantly simplified the search for work and socialization abroad raises some concerns. The fact is that the presence of higher education without knowledge of the language did not give the possibility of guaranteed employment. Another factor affecting the employment process was that most women who left had to take care of their children. The need to babysit significantly reduced opportunities to find work abroad, especially since there were many women with toddlers among the migrants, whom they sought to protect from the horrors of war.

Due to the situation mentioned, most women had a burden on their shoulders, which motivated them to search for an apartment suitable for living with children. Men who had previously travelled to the EU for short-term contracts tended to be less picky about housing conditions and sought to maximize earnings. And often, the expenses on the comfort of living were cut. It was another thing when women who were supposed to take care of comfortable living and children's education ended up abroad. And unfortunately, it was not always possible to provide decent living and learning conditions for children. This situation influenced the decision on prolonging or not the stay in the territory of the European Union countries.

Most likely, the spread of information about Ukrainian refugees' living conditions significantly influenced the decision to come back home at the end of March 2022. On the one hand, some Ukrainians, especially in Poland and Germany, were provided with comfortable private residences for temporary living. On the other hand, some of the migrants were forced to live in public facilities unsuitable for the long-term habitation of many people.

The introduction during the quarantine of a remote form of work and study contributed to the spread among Ukrainian youth of the belief in the possibility of working for foreign companies or studying in foreign universities while being in Ukraine. In this case, the success of work or study could become an essential factor in deciding to work abroad. However, forced migration in the context of war has put on the agenda the prospect of staying in the receiving countries for a long or indefinite period. This issue required formal employment and household arrangements. And it was significantly complicated due to the necessity of the origin of the diploma nostrification procedure and confirmation of knowledge of a foreign

language at the level determined by the employer. In addition, a significant part of migrants (about 40%) could not keep their previous place of work, even when such work could be carried out remotely (Rating sociological group, 2022).

Ukrainian migrants were forced to adapt to an unusual way of life. Libanova E. believes that if the conflict drags on, many of the Ukrainians who emigrated from Ukraine will be able to adapt abroad, as a result of which many men will move abroad with their wives and children after the end of the war (Libanova E., 2022). According to the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, only 42.9% of Ukrainians are ready to plan the future for their children and grandchildren in Ukraine if the war continues as the current hostilities are taking place (Nezhyhai I., 2022). However, the existence of plans does not mean their implementation, and the conditions of adaptation of Ukrainian migrants in the EU countries turned out to be more complicated than many refugees imagined. As a result, the flow of migrants significantly decreased, and some Ukrainians were forced to return to Ukraine.

According to many media reports, the imaginary deadline for the war's end was May 9, when it was believed that Russia intended to end the aggression by that date. However, when the war dragged on, and statements by Russian officials indicated intentions to extend the "special military operation" until all its stated goals were achieved, and the Ukrainian authorities showed no intention of ceding territories, it became clear that hostilities could last quite a long time. And that is why the idea of waiting out the war in a safe place in the EU was no longer so attractive since it could mean giving up property and an established way of life in Ukraine and starting life "from scratch" abroad. Therefore, after May 9, 2022, according to the data of the border service of Ukraine, the number of those returning to Ukraine began to increase significantly, and about 2.7 million people returned (Gamalius I., 2022).

As it turned out, the most excellent chances for legal employment in the EU countries were given to persons with the appropriate level of professionalism and qualification training, with the possession of modern information and communication technologies, knowledge of at least two foreign languages, who showed a high level of adaptation to the culture of the host country. Educational migrants who obtained their first or second education abroad with the possibility of further employment also had advantages. For other migrants, official employment meant, as a rule, a decrease in professional status and significant difficulties in finding a legal workplace. Knowledge of the specifics of the labour market of EU countries and the ability to adapt to the conditions of long-term residence proved to be insufficient for the majority of Ukrainian migrants. These motives led to the strengthening of the re-emigration process. The overall process significantly strengthened the so-called "sense of home" among Ukrainians and the desire to adapt positive phenomena from the life of Western Europeans to Ukrainian realities.

The return process of Ukrainian migrants shows not only the difficulties of their adaptation to living conditions in the EU but also the awareness of some advantages of living in Ukraine and the desire to change the situation for the better in their own country. Such aspirations can be successfully realized by considering the impact of foreign migration on the state's economy and the formation of national and regional programs to return forced migrants to Ukraine.

Return of foreign migrants to Ukraine: problems and ways to solve them

The nature and scale of foreign migration at the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation created specific threats to the national security of Ukraine due to significant changes in the labour market. The departure of a substantial number of citizens outside the borders of Ukraine significantly affected the formation of demand for certain goods and services and created problems with the provision of qualified workers in some areas of production and service provision. The hotel and restaurant business and the field of tourism have lost many employees. The total number of jobs lost during the war is estimated at 4.8 million (Kapustynska K., 2022).

At the same time, it is believed that by the end of the war, the issue of the lack of workers will be relatively irrelevant, as a large number of enterprises, institutions, and organizations have stopped working due to hostilities, some of which have been destroyed. However, post-war reconstruction will require an increasing number of workers and employees, and thus the development of programs for the return of external migrants seems quite urgent.

In Ukraine, at different levels, several approaches to forming a strategy for the return of those who left the country during the war were proposed. First, we are discussing the development of state programs for reconstruction and business support, which would allow the creation of the required number of jobs. In addition, there is a claim that local authorities are prioritized in this matter, as they are better able to know the needs of workers and the scope and nature of reconstruction work on the ground (Nezhyhai I., 2022).

Scientists believe in the need to provide state support for the return of Ukrainian migrants. At the same time, such support should not be limited to allocating certain funds for reconstruction. Still, it should include measures to ensure comfortable

living with prospects for career growth, as well as the organization of the educational process for children (Nazarenko Y., 2022).

The state must ensure the reconstruction of citizens' housing destroyed during the war. Otherwise, those who lost it will have nowhere to return. Preference should be given to the construction of such housing, the construction of which can be completed within the threat of our months (Shteingauz, D., Kuznyetsova, A., & Achimovich, D., 2021).

However, when developing housing reconstruction programs, it should be taken into account that some of the settlements in Donbas have been focused on ensuring the operation of certain enterprises since Soviet times. The destruction of such enterprises undermines the idea of restoring monofunctional settlements. The lack of employment opportunities for citizens in such settlements will increase their costs for moving to the workplace. In addition, the Soviet practice of forming settlements focused mainly on housing workers of industrial enterprises should give way to creating multifunctional settlements that will be part of economic clusters.

The restoration of settlements where about 80-90% of the housing stock was destroyed (for example, Mariupol, Popasna, Severodonetsk) should take place, taking into account the economic feasibility of the operation of industrial enterprises of a particular type in these areas. When old enterprises are destroyed, and the construction of new ones requires significant capital investments, it seems appropriate to create new settlements. The choice of their location can be determined not only by economic expediency but also by environmental requirements since part of the enterprises of the extractive industry represent a threat to the environment due to the flooding of mines. Their depth and features of mineral extraction allow us to consider the issue of a significant reduction in coal production. Accordingly, monofunctional settlements should give way to multifunctional ones, the placement of which simplifies logistical processes.

The repurposing of settlements should be accompanied by deploying an educational network capable of providing training and retraining qualified specialists. The retraining organization should be accompanied by a well-considered information campaign, guiding citizens to return to their previous places of residence and creating hope for a successful business.

In addition to improving the settlement structure in the East and South of Ukraine, a comprehensive rethinking of the placement of labour resources is needed, focused on modern approaches to the placement of production and improving the culture of consumption.

Structural restructuring of the economy and modernization of production facilities that would meet modern requirements became an urgent need. Such reconstruction cannot be carried out without the help of other countries. And, of course, foreign companies will take care of their interests while restoring production facilities in Ukraine. Therefore, it is crucial to organize a retraining system to make the most of the potential of people who were forced to leave Ukraine and return to their homeland. Their efforts in finding a job should be directed in a rational direction. They should be different from the elementary need for survival at the expense of obtaining funds from highly productive work, possibly by improving professional skills.

The participation of foreigners in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine should be regulated by the conditions for the creation of competitive production since the construction of only residential premises on the site of destroyed buildings will not solve the problem of the return of foreign migrants. Without the possibility of getting a job after returning, restoring the housing stock will not sufficiently encourage the return of those who left Ukraine during the war.

For re-emigrants to settle in Ukraine, it is also necessary to stimulate local government initiatives to create new jobs and simplify business. The war's end will set the agenda for competition between the regions of Ukraine for qualified workers. The western and central regions of the state, to which a significant number of internally displaced persons moved during hostilities, may be in a winning position. The attractiveness of specific regions for the residence of those who returned to Ukraine from abroad can be determined by the distance of these lands from the aggressor country. Therefore, it is necessary to convince citizens of the safety of the regions close to the Russian Federation. Otherwise, Ukraine will face a shortage of workers, primarily in the eastern and part of southern regions.

Local programs for settling re-emigrants should include temporary unemployment benefits (for three to six months), simplified procedures for opening a business, preferential conditions for renting premises (without the right to transfer them to sublease) and allocation of land plots for residential development. Material assistance to those who returned to Ukraine and aspired to restore/start their own business should be focused on funds that re-emigrants are ready to invest in developing the economic activity. The coefficients of such assistance will depend on the financial capabilities of the local authorities and the importance of a specific type of business development offered by those who have returned from abroad. One of the criteria determining the amount of financial assistance for running a business may be the number of guaranteed jobs that this or that entrepreneur can create.

The local authorities should allocate land plots for constructing premises for re-emigrants. Such a statement is because it is likely that some of those who lost relatives or loved ones due to enemy shelling will not want to return to their previous places of residence and prefer to settle down in a new home. In this case, a balanced decision about the possibility of building residential premises can play a vital role in the post-war competition for labour resources in Ukraine.

The return of a large number of forced migrants to Ukraine indicates the difficulty of adaptation of citizens in the countries of the European Union and their challenges with employment. In addition, the opportunity to compare living and working conditions in Ukraine and the EU, in general, led to the realization of an inevitable overestimation of the standard of living of Europeans and the fact that the standard of living in pre-war Ukraine remained underestimated. In addition to obvious economic problems, a conflict of values has arisen in European countries. The importance of respect for human rights, a benevolent attitude, and the desire to help people affected by threats to the safety of their lives in their homeland came into conflict with the values of preserving their cultural traditions, the achieved professional level and personal way of life. Therefore, according to some forecasts, about 80-90% of forced migrants will return to Ukraine (Gamalius I., 2022). The data in Figure 4 provide an idea of the scope of the return of refugees to Ukraine.




Figure 4. Refugees crossing the border into Ukraine from countries-neighbouring (on 26.02.2023). Note: * - the figure for individual refugees recorded in the country is an estimate as potential further movements or returns cannot be factored in for the time being. (Source: based on UN-CHR, 2023)

The most significant number (7 634 691) of forced migrants returned to Ukraine from Poland, Romania (1 643 800) and Slovakia (975 009). Among the citizens of Ukraine who left Ukraine due to hostilities at the beginning of the Russian aggression and are now returning to the country, women predominate (87%, just as women made up the majority of those who left the country at the beginning of the war). If among those who left the country at the beginning of the war, the largest group of respondents was people aged 30 to 39 (37%), then among those who returned, the share of representatives of this age group is 25%. This may be because, among those who return, compared to those who left, there are fewer people who travel with children (45% and 63%, respectively), and representatives of the 30-39 age group most often have small children. And accordingly, among those who enter, compared to those who leave, more people travel alone (31% and 13%, respectively). This shows that Ukraine's citizens with small children are less likely to return to Ukraine (Razumkov Centre, 2022). This may be evidence that the mothers of some of the children are still afraid to return with them to Ukraine, fearing the escalation of hostilities. On the other hand, such data may indicate hopes of getting a job in Ukraine. At the same time, the fact that women of working age are returning proves that the employment of Ukrainian women with small children in the EU countries was quite tricky, which forced them to return to Ukraine in search of work.

This again proves the importance of a well-balanced implementation of employment programs for forced migrants who returned to Ukraine in our country. Such employment can be an essential incentive to return children who were forcibly left on the territory of European countries rather than reuniting families abroad at the expense of the departure of husbands to their wives after the war.

DISCUSSION

The definition of the terms and conditions for the return of Ukrainian refugees remains the most debatable. Most researchers agree that the timing of the continuation of hostilities will be the most important factor determining the return of Ukrainians to their homeland. However, some of the entrepreneurs who were forced to leave Ukraine will be able to successfully develop their businesses abroad. In this case, the greatest prospects are opening up in Poland. Although O.

Levytska (2022) defines it as a threat, the circumstances may change after the war. If after the end of the war favourable conditions for investment will be created in Ukraine and business transparency will be ensured, then this can provide attractive conditions for re-emigration. And it is not necessary that the reunification of families after the war will take place outside the borders of Ukraine as E. Libanova (2022) emphasizes. Leaving what they fought for may be unacceptable to many Ukrainian men. Especially since cooperation between former soldiers can be continued already in peacetime. The basis for such cooperation will be the trust that was formed during service in the army. In addition, during the service in the army, partnerships were established between some entrepreneurs, some of these entrepreneurs served in the armed forces, while others were volunteers. For the post-war business environment of Ukraine, business ties that have been tested for strength by the war will be important.

The recovery of the Ukrainian economy on favourable terms may become more attractive than the struggle for consumers in the market abroad. A positive point may be that the acquired knowledge and business skills in the EU countries can be successfully used at home. But overcoming corruption is a necessary condition for this. There are most doubts about the return of students who have successfully studied abroad and have great chances for socialization outside of Ukraine. Although, according to A. Hayudskyi (2022), the return of Ukrainians will depend on the state's policy, for most of them the feeling of home can be decisive. The desire to participate in the reconstruction of Ukraine after the war can become decisive for many Ukrainian businessmen who went abroad. Transparent business conditions and a familiar business environment can be very attractive to them. All the more so, as the restoration of old business contacts is significantly easier than the formation of new connections in European countries, not the last role in this will be played by more familiar conditions of competitive struggle in Ukraine.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the fact that the purpose of the article was to determine the nature and scale of migration from Ukraine, the prospects of re-emigration and outline the government's steps aimed at returning migrants' dollars in Ukraine, we can claim that more than 7 million people of working age left the country, the absolute majority of which were women with minor children and young people who left for education. The age of emigrants allowed them to integrate more successfully outside Ukraine, but the level of professional knowledge imposed significant restrictions on socialization opportunities. The prolongation of the Russian-Ukrainian war conditioned the growth of emigrants' desire to socialize abroad. Young people who left for studying in higher educational institutions, mostly do not intend to return to Ukraine. The scale of external migration is currently one of the most important threats to Ukraine's national security. The departure of many promising young people is also a threat to people who mainly seek to master the latest IT technologies. The nature of forced external migration shows the reluctance of many parents to expose their own children to dangerous children and in the future, such motivation will be one of the main factors that will determine the scale of re-emigration. The reluctance of a part of potential re-emigrants to return to their place of previous residence after agreeing to live in other regions of Ukraine will cause employers to struggle for qualified workers.

Despite the importance of foreign aid for the reconstruction of Ukraine, citizens mostly hope for the effective work of local authorities capable of forming favourable conditions for the development of small businesses and to provide conditions for the transportation and placement of industrial equipment removed from the war zone in a new location. Commissions and special working groups should be formed in local authorities that will deal with the problem of accommodating re-emigrants, providing them with legal assistance and allocating land plots suitable for placing production. Determining the locations for the installation of enterprises taken out of the combat zone should be coordinated as much as possible with the needs of the development of the local business environment. For re-emigrants, conditions must be created for rehabilitation, retraining, raising the educational and professional level, and educating children without risk to their lives and health in the event of enemy shelling. The construction of new residential complexes in the regions should be an important method of settling re-emigrants in their new place of residence. The construction of such complexes will avoid the growth of social tension and optimize the use of the labour force by reducing the time it takes to move to the workplace.

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ЗОВНІШНІ МІГРАЦІЇ В УМОВАХ РОСІЙСЬКО-УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ ВІЙНИ

Початок російсько-української війни спричинив потужну хвилю міграції українців до Західної Європи. Затяжний характер війни та можливість соціалізуватися в країнах ЄС сформували в частини українських біженців бажання не повертатися в Україну, що створює дефіцит робочої сили, на яку уряд покладає великі надії в повоєнному відновленні економіки. Метою роботи є дослідження структури, динаміки та причин вимушеної зовнішньої міграції з України у 2022 році й подальшої рееміграції, окреслення дієвих заходів щодо повернення вимушених мігрантів. Для емпіричного дослідження динаміки та структури міграційних процесів за досліджуваний період були опрацьовані дані UNHCR. Системний аналіз дозволив обґрунтувати теоретико-методологічні засади та закономірності формування політики рееміграції в Україні, а метод експертних оцінок – оцінити вплив зовнішніх міграцій, викликаних воєнними діями в Україні, на соціально-економічний розвиток. Аналіз причин міграції та рееміграції українців у 2022 р. дозволяє стверджувати, що причини рееміграції набагато вагоміші. Це дає підстави стверджувати, що більшість українських мігрантів після закінчення війни повернуться в Україну, якщо урядом будуть запроваджені державні програми із забезпечення житлом реемігрантів, які втратили житло через війну: пільгові умови оренди приміщень, побудова багатофункціональних поселень із належними екологічними умовами на місцях монофункціональних поселень, державна фінансова підтримка та створення нових робочих місць. При цьому автори прогнозують нерівномірність заселення України, коли більш населеними будуть західні та центральні регіони держави. Найбільшим викликом для уряду буде повернення висококваліфікованих українців з високим рівнем адаптації до іншої культури, які володіють іноземними мовами, IT-технологіями і в послугах яких украї зацікавлені країни ЄС. Для цієї категорії мігрантів потрібні ще додатково спрощені процедури відкриття бізнесу та широка інформаційна кампанія, яка сформує впевненість в успішному бізнесі в Україні.

Ключові слова: війна, економіка, розвиток, міграція, зайнятість

JEL Класифікація: H 56, O15, R 23